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ABSTRACT: The development, production and state regulation of diphtheria serum is outlined 
against the background of industrialisation, standardization, falling standards of living and 
rising social conflict in fin de siècle Germany. On one hand, diphtheria serum offered a cure 
for an infectious disease and was a major therapeutic innovation in modern medicine. On 
the other hand, the new serum was a remedy of biological origin and nothing was known 
about its side effects or long-term impact. Moreover, serum therapy promised high profits 
for manufacturers who succeeded in stabilizing the production process and producing large 
quantities of serum in so-called industrial production plants. To minimize public health risks, a 
broad system of state regulation was installed, including the supervision of serum production 
and distribution. The case of diphtheria serum illustrates the indirect forms of government 
supervision and influence adopted in the German Empire and the cooperation and networking 
among science, state and industry.
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1. Introduction
At the Tenth International Congress of Medicine in August 1890, Robert 
Koch (1843-1910) announced that he had found a cure for tuberculosis. In 
the summer and autumn of 1890 tuberculin was enthusiastically heralded 
as a breakthrough in modern medicine and its inventor, Robert Koch, as a 
national hero. Early in 1891, however, it became clear that tuberculin could 
not really cure tuberculosis, and it had also become obvious that several 
people had died after being treated with the product. The unbounded 
optimism of the German population had turned into sour deception and 
the medical triumph of a year earlier had become a public health fiasco 1. 
The public health administration found itself in an embarrassing position. 
It had done nothing to protect the public from this harmful adventure and 
had failed to test Koch’s new treatment for either its efficacy or its inof-
fensiveness. The public was quick to criticize the relevant authorities for 
their impotence and the lack of any appropriate response.
The tuberculin affair had a great deal of influence on subsequent 
research in bacteriology —especially at the newly founded Institute for 
Infectious Diseases [Institut für Infektionskrankheiten, which would later 
become the Robert-Koch-Institut]. As Barbara Elkeles has pointed out, the 
experience with tuberculin obstructed subsequent research into serum 
therapy. The diphtheria serum was only sold in pharmacies after numer-
ous animal experiments had taken place and following monitored trials in 
children’s hospitals 2. When the diphtheria serum finally started to be sold 
in pharmacies in August 1894, the relevant medical authorities introduced 
broad security measures to minimize public health risks.
The present article describes the development, the production and the 
state control of the diphtheria serum in the German Empire at the end of 
the 19th century as an example of the cooperation and networking between 
science, state and industry. Furthermore, the example of the diphtheria 
serum serves to illustrate the indirect forms of governmental oversight and 
influence adopted under the German Empire. After the tuberculin affair of 
 1. For detailed information see GRADMANN, Christoph. Krankheit im Labor. Robert Koch und die 
medizinische Bakteriologie, Göttingen, Wallstein Verlag, 2005.
 2. ELKELES, Barbara. Der moralische Diskurs über das medizinische Menschenexperiment im 19. 
Jahrhundert, Stuttgart, Gustav Fischer 1996, p. 148; and retrospektive WERNICKE, Erich. Zur 
Geschichte des Diphtherieheilserums. Zeitschrift für ärztliche Fortbildung, 1931, 28, 160-161.
Diphtheria serum and serotherapy. Development, production and regulation
Dynamis 2007; 27: 107-131
109
1890, the authorities responsible for public health installed a complex system 
of control that could be interpreted as a technology of trust to ensure that 
only pure and effective serum was sold in the German pharmacies.
2. The socio-cultural context of science in fin de siècle Germany
In the 1890s, Germany was in the take-off phase of industrialisation, with 
rising steel production and the manufacture of all kinds of machines, chemi-
cals and pharmaceuticals supported by the development of communications 
as well as mechanical, electrical and optical technology. The universities 
and science in particular were seen to lie at the base of this innovation and 
were considered highly prestigious, providing the numerous innovations and 
discoveries behind economic expansion. The mass production of all kinds 
of goods also brought with it problems of standardisation and economic 
linkage, as well as issues of intellectual property rights 3. 
Progress and the rise of a modern industrial society had two sides. The 
other side of modernity was the utterly devastating living conditions of the 
working class and a rising underclass, contributing to high mortality rates 
especially among the poor, as well as generally catastrophic sanitary condi-
tions in the cities. Discussions about the spread of nervous conditions 4, 
degeneration, and anti-semitism, as well as criticisms of technology and 
apocalyptic prophecies painted science and technology in a negative light. 
Ambiguity was everywhere, although generally covered over with a veneer 
of chauvinistic nationalism. Following the «glorious» war of 1870/1871 and 
the largely popular unification, the German Empire experienced a desperate 
need to get its international place in the sun. This search for priority and 
for being a world power also operated in the sciences, with the famous race 
between Robert Koch and Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) to find the pathogenic 
 3. For the standardisation of technical, mechanical, electrical and optical devises and high-
precision instruments the Physikalisch Technische Reichsanstalt was founded, see CAHAN, 
David. Meister der Messung. Die Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt im Deutschen Kaiserreich, 
Weinheim, VCH, 1992; legislation and standardisation within the Industrial Revolution in VEC, 
Milos. Recht und Normierung in der Industriellen Revolution. Neue Strukturen der Normsetzung in 
Völkerrecht, staatlicher Gesetzgebung und gesellschaftlicher Selbstnormierung, Frankfurt, Vittorio 
Klostermann, 2006.
 4. For example RADKAU, Joachim. Das Zeitalter der Nervosität. Deutschland zwischen Bismarck und 
Hitler, München, Propyläen, 2000.
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agent responsible for cholera in 1883 being but one example of national 
rivalry between France and Germany. Thus, it is unsurprising that a certain 
medical scepticism accompanied the many innovations seen in the life sci-
ences during this period 5. 
To improve the disastrous situation of large swathes of the population 
and to minimize the risk of epidemics, several steps were taken. In 1876 the 
Imperial Health Office [Kaiserliches Gesundheitsamt] was founded with the 
aim of improving public health, and in the 1880s a system of social security 
was implemented, providing much wider health coverage. Epidemics were 
not only a human tragedy but by introducing anarchic and destabilising 
elements represented a risk for society and the political regime in place. 
This was the socio-cultural background against which Emil Behring started 
his research on inner disinfection and immunisation around 1890. 
The research into a remedy for diphtheria, the large-scale production 
of sera and the regulation of sera as biologicals occurred at an intersection 
of these different socio-cultural developments. The ambiguity of that time 
was also reflected in the bacteriological research. The search for a remedy 
against the disease was perceived as an urgent social task. At the end of 
the 19th century, diphtheria was one of the main causes of mortality for 
children, with 60,000 children dying from diphtheria every year in the 
German Empire. The serum therapy against diphtheria and other diseases 
was a major therapeutic innovation in modern medicine 6. On the other 
hand, when it was introduced, nothing was known about the side-effects 
associated with this biological agent or about what the long-term effects 
of the treatment might be.
3. The development of diphtheria serum in Germany
In the first half of the 1880s, Friedrich Löffler (1852-1915) at the Imperial 
Health Office in Berlin ‘discovered’ or rather identified the organism that 
caused diphtheria. But the «discovery» did not explain the disease. He was 
 5. DINGES, Martin (ed.) Medizinkritische Bewegungen im Deutschen Reich (ca. 1870-ca. 1933), Stuttgart, 
Franz Steiner, 1996.
 6. WEINDLING, Paul J. From isolation to therapy. Children’s hospitals and diphtheria in fin de 
siècle Paris, London and Berlin. In: COOTER, Roger (ed.), In the name of the child. Health and 
welfare, 1880-1940, London, Routledge, 1992, pp. 124-145.
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convinced that the bacteria he had found was not the cause of the physical 
damage associated with the disease, because the clinical symptoms could 
be found in different parts of the body, while the germ was not found in all 
these parts. Nevertheless, he could not prove this conjecture 7. Later on, 
Émile Roux (1853-1933) and his assistant Alexandre Yersin (1863-1943) 
working at the newly founded Pasteur Institute in Paris first filtered out 
a toxin from bacterial cultures, which was able independently to provoke 
the typical symptoms of diphtheria: massive destruction of cells in the af-
fected parts of the body, mostly in the throat 8. Death was caused by the 
membranous inflammations and swelling in the throat or by intoxication 
of the necrotic cells. The story of the development of the diphtheria serum 
starts when Emil Behring (1854-1917) entered the Institute for Hygiene 
in Berlin. He re-examined the research that had been done by Loeffler 
and Roux and started looking for a remedy for tetanus and diphtheria. 
When he turned to more immunological questions he found that inocu-
lation with anthrax bacteria did not have the same effect on all animals; 
rats, for example, were naturally immune to the effects of these bacteria. 
Behring also observed that serum had immunising and bactericidal prop-
erties. The bactericidal impact was not a general attribute of the serum, 
however, but rather linked to a specific infective organism 9. In several in 
vitro experiments he noted that the anthrax bacteria did not grow on an 
agar medium where he had added the serum of rats, which are immune to 
anthrax, but did grow with the serum of guinea pigs, which are eminently 
susceptible to anthrax 10. Based on his experiments on inner disinfection 
 7. LÖFFLER, Friedrich. Untersuchungen über die Bedeutung der Mikroorganismen für die Entste-
hung der Diphterie beim Menschen, bei der Taube und beim Kalbe. Mittheilungen aus dem 
Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamte, 1884, 2, 421-499.
 8. ROUX, Émile; YERSIN, Alexandre. Contribution à l’étude de la diphthérie. Annales de l’Institut 
Pasteur, 1888, 2, 629-661; ROUX, Émile; YERSIN, Alexandre. Contribution à l’étude de la di-
phthérie (2e mémoire). Annales de l’Institut Pasteur, 1889, 3, 273-288; ROUX, Émile; YERSIN, 
Alexandre. Contribution à l’étude de la diphthérie (3e mémoire). Annales de l’Institut Pasteur, 
1890, 4, 385-426.
 9. Later on, Behring amplified and concluded: “Jede Krankheit verlangt zu ihrer Heilung ein 
besonders präparirtes Blut [Every disease requires a specially prepared serum to heal it.]” 
BEHRING, Emil. Das Tetanusheilserum und seine Anwendung auf tetanuskranke Menschen, 
Leipzig, Georg Thieme, 1892, p. 37; for more on specificity see MAZUMDAR, Pauline M. H. 
Species and specificity. An interpretation of the history of immunology, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995.
 10. For an overview see BEHRING, Emil. Die Blutserumtherapie bei Diphtherie und Tetanus. Zeitschrift 
für Hygiene und Infectionskrankheiten, 1892, 12, 1-9; for further details see THROM, Carola. Das 
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Behring found out that laboratory animals who had survived infection 
with a certain disease were immune to the same disease and also against 
highly potent bacteria for a certain length of time. In collaboration with 
Shibasaburo Kitasato (1853-1931), a guest researcher at the Institute for 
Hygiene from Tokyo University, Behring took blood samples from a rab-
bit that had been immunized against tetanus and injected the serum into 
non-immune mice, which themselves were infected a day later with tetanus 
bacteria. They observed that the pre-treated mice had become immune 
and did not show any symptoms of the disease while the control animals 
died shortly after being infected. The immunity, it appeared, could be 
transferred between animals 11.
In the following year, Behring advanced to the next step in realising a 
medical application of this research, and, along with his friend and fellow 
doctor Erich Wernicke (1859-1928), conducted experiments with diphtheria 
in guinea pigs. He succeeded in immunizing guinea pigs against diphtheria, 
and then showed that other guinea pigs injected with serum from immunized 
ones and then infected with diphtheria bacteria or toxin neither reacted 
nor became ill. In order to apply this principle in human medicine, Behring 
had to produce serum of high potency in large quantities. Already in au-
tumn 1891 he started to immunize sheep by injecting small quantities of 
diphtheria toxin and slowly raising the doses. Initially, they inherited sheep 
from Robert Koch and then Behring started a cooperation with Wilhelm 
Schütz (1839-1920) from the Veterinary School [Tierarzneischule] so that 
he could perform trials using animals bigger than guinea pigs, but which 
were also susceptible to diphtheria. Furthermore, Behring and Wernicke 
invested their own money. But the experiments were expensive, and after the 
initial investment in sheep and other animals, they also had to find money 
Diphtherieserum. Ein neues Therapieprinzip, seine Entwicklung und Markteinführung, Stuttgart, 
Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995, pp. 33-38; LINTON, Derek S. Emil von Behring. 
Infectious disease, immunology, serum therapy, Philadelphia, American Philosophical Society, 
2005.
 11. BEHRING, Emil; KITASATO, Shibasaburo. Ueber das Zustandekommen der Diphtherie-Immunität 
und der Tetanus-Immunität bei Thieren. Deutsche Medizinische Wochenschrift, 1890, Nr. 49, 
1113-1114; ZEISS, Heinz; BIELING, Richard. Emil von Behring. Gestalt und Werk, Berlin, Bruno 
Schultz, 1941; for further details see THROM, note 10, pp. 38-40; LINTON, note 10. For Be-
hring’s concept of inner disinfection see SIMON, Jonathan. Emil Behring’s medical culture. 
From disinfection to serotherapy. Medical History, 2007, 51, 199-217.
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to feed them 12. Laboratory animals could be cured, but experiments with 
sick children at the university hospital in Berlin at the beginning of 1892 
(conducted by Ernst von Bergmann 1836-1907), at the children’s ward of 
the Charité Hospital in Berlin in spring 1892 (conducted by Eduard Enoch 
1820-1910) as well as experiments from November 1892 to June 1893 in 
Leipzig (Otto Heubner 1843-1926) all failed 13. Nevertheless, the experi-
ments showed the inoffensiveness of the serum and gave reason to hope 
that more potent serum might be able to cure diptheria. More money was 
needed, however, to fund further experiments 14. At this point, the story 
transformed from one involving a scientific network into the story of a 
network involving science, industry, and the state. 
In April 1892, Behring received a letter from August Laubenheimer 
(1848-1904), a member of the supervisory board at the Farbwerke Hoechst, 
proposing a partnership. The Farbwerke Hoechst would finance Behring’s 
experiments and in return they would have the right, if the experiments 
succeeded, to produce and distribute the serum. Nevertheless, despite the 
financial sponsorship, the experiments did not really make any progress. 
New inspiration and stimuli that pushed the process forward came from 
a competing research team and the Institute for Infectious Diseases itself. 
At the veterinary school in Berlin, Hans Aronson (1865-1919) started tri-
als based on the results of Behring and Kitasato. Instead of sheep or dogs 
he used horses for his experiments because they gave larger quantities of 
serum. Aronson cooperated with the Berlin pharmaceutical firm Schering 
that in return financed the horses stabled at the Veterinary School. Later 
on, Behring also used horses to obtain larger quantities of serum, but the 
problem of the potency of the serum remained. At this point, Paul Ehrlich, 
a colleague of Behring’s who was also working on immunisation at the 
Institute for Infectious Diseases, also became involved. In his experiments 
 12. For a resume of their experiments see BEHRING, Emil; WERNICKE, Erich. Ueber Immunisirung 
und Heilung von Versuchsthieren bei der Diphtherie. Zeitschrift für Hygiene und Infections-
krankheiten, 1892, 12, 10-44. The notebooks of the experiments are in the Erich Wernicke 
Papers, Staatsbibliothek Berlin, Preußischer Kulturbesitz.
 13. THROM, note 10, pp. 50-52.
 14. «Wir sind jedoch zu der Ueberzeugung gekommen, dass es die Kräfte und Mittel unserer privaten 
Thätigkeit übersteigt, den Versuchen eine solche Ausdehnung zu geben, um mit praktischem 
Erfolge unsere Diphtheriebehandlungsmethode auf den Menschen zu übertragen […] und 
so haben wir uns entschlossen […] weitere Kreise für die Angriffnahme von Versuchen im 
grossen Massstabe zu interessieren». BEHRING and WERNICKE, note 12, p. 11.
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Ehrlich focussed on the augmentation and evaluation of the serum’s im-
pact. He observed that the toxin had to be injected over a longer period of 
time into the test animals in steadily increasing doses in order to obtain a 
serum of higher value. The enhancement of the serum’s potency was not 
a linear function with respect to time, however, but varied, rising and fall-
ing: after a few days of stagnancy, the potency measured in antitoxin-units 
suddenly began to increase progressively. After reaching at its maximum 
strength, the antitoxin then declined back to its former level of potency 15. 
The trick was to find the point of maximum strength, just before the level 
of the antitoxin started to decrease. In spring 1894, clinical trials were 
made with 220 children in Berlin hospitals with considerable success. The 
mortality rate halved from more than fifty per cent (mortality rate at that 
time) to 23.6 per cent – even serious and apparently hopeless cases were 
cured 16. In March 1894, the company Schering announced that they were 
able to produce diphtheria serum, but in fact they were unable to offer a 
very high quality serum —not even attaining the potency advertised on 
the phial— and they were also unable to supply the quantities needed 17. 
Starting in August 1894, phials of diphtheria serum from the Farbwerke 
Hoechst became available to a wider public via the pharmacies where they 
were sold. As expected, the sale of diphtheria serum was a great economic 
success. One month later, at the Eighth International Congress of Hygiene 
in Budapest in September 1894, the scientific world was introduced to 
the new therapy against diphtheria, and the serum was greeted as a great 
breakthrough in the treatment of a terrible disease 18. 
The research involved in the development of the diphtheria serum 
took nearly four years and involved several scientists. Following a large 
number of animal experiments, several clinical trials were made in hospi-
tals to ensure the potency as well as the inoffensiveness of the new remedy 
 15. BRIEGER, Ludwig; EHRLICH, Paul. Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Milch immunisirter Thiere. Zeitschrift 
für Hygiene und Infectionskrankheiten, 1893, 13, 336-346; THROM, note 10, p. 52-53.
 16. EHRLICH, Paul; KOSSEL, Hermann; WASSERMANN, August. Ueber Gewinnung und Verwendung 
des Diphtherieheilserums. Deutsche Medicinische Wochenschrift, 1894, 20, 353-355; WEIND
LING, Paul J. From medical resarch to clinical practise. Serum therapy for diphtheria in the 
1890s. In: PICKSTONE, John V. (ed.), Medical innovations in historical perspective, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 1992, pp. 72-83. 
 17. The serum was tested by Paul Ehrlich and he found out that is was not as effective as had been 
announced, see Bundesarchiv Berlin (Federal Archives, hereafter BA Berlin), R 86/1646.
 18. THROM, note 10; ZEISS and BIELING, note 11.
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before it started being sold in the pharmacies. We can observe a complex 
form of networking 19, with every scientist anticipating research based on 
the results of other scientists, either indirectly by reading their publica-
tions or directly by cooperating in research groups, such as the various 
research groups at the Institute for Infectious Diseases. The results of the 
experiments were published rapidly in one of the weekly medical journals 
like the Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift or the Deutsche Medizinische 
Wochenschrift. There was open access to all this information so that every 
microbiologist or bacteriologically trained physician could predict the re-
search results or reconstruct and improve the published experiments. The 
price for this openness was that shortly after his publications Behring had 
to fight off several scientific competitors —especially Hans Aronson— who 
proclaimed themselves to be the initiators of the innovation of diphtheria 
serum 20. Far from the ideal of a cooperative collective enterprise, everybody 
claimed priority for the discovery. Following Robert Merton, the discovery 
of something previously unknown or the development of an innovation 
serves to provide institutionalized anchorage of the inventor’s originality 
as measured by the associated public acclaim. Innovation was seen as the 
scientist’s contribution to the progress that characterized modernity, and in 
return the researcher could expect some kind of reward like a professorship, 
funding, or a scientific prize. 21 Behring was part of a scientific network, 
benefiting from other research results and also sharing the results of his 
own experiments, while at the same time fighting for priority. 
 19. Here I will only talk about the network of human actors and leave out the innumerable non-
human actors like host animals, laboratory animals, bacteria cultures, devices and others, 
although these should be included according to the Actor Network Theory. KNORRCETINA, 
Karin D. (ed.) Science observed. Perspectives on the Social Study of Sciene, London, Sage, 1983; 
LATOUR, Bruno. Science in context, How to follow scientists and engineers through society, Cam-
bridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1987; LAW, John (ed.) A Sociology of monsters. Essays 
on power, technology and domination, London, Routledge, 1991. 
 20. The conflicts with Ogata and Emmerich are described in THROM, note 10, p. 45-46; the conflict 
with Hans Aronson in issue 15 and 17 of the Deutsche Medicinische Wochenschrift 1894; ZEISS 
and BIELING, note 11. In 1903 Emil Behring had a serious conflict with Carl Enoch, partner of 
the serum producer Ruete & Enoch, concerning the priority of the diphtheria serum. Enoch 
had written in a draft for a more general overview that Behring and Ehrlich had discovered 
the diphtheria serum —a claim that provoked a rebuttal from Behring. The correspondence 
is in the Rochefeller Archive Center, Paul Ehrlich Collection, Box 1, Folder 2.
 21. MERTON, Robert K. Prioritätsstreitigkeiten in der Wissenschaft. In: Entwicklung und Wandel von 
Forschungsinteressen. Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftssoziologie, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1985, 
pp. 258-300.
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Moreover, apart from this typical scientific network, there were other 
relations involved in the development of the diphtheria serum. Emil Be-
hring was a staff officer [Stabsarzt], the protégé of the surgeon general of 
the Prussian Army [Generalstabsarzt] Alwin von Coler (1831-1901), and 
was working on a remedy against diphtheria at the Institute for Infectious 
Diseases helped by various different colleagues and assistants. There was 
a constant circulation of military surgeons in the Prussian army through 
the Institute for Infectious Diseases, with staff drawn from the armies of 
all the federal states from the German Empire 22. The state-run scientific 
institutions were unable to work without the military surgeons like Emil 
Behring, Erich Wernicke or Dr. Weisser. Thus, for example, surgeon major 
Weisser was head of the bacteriological laboratory at the Imperial Health 
Office for several years 23. Moreover, Behring cooperated with hospitals 
and with the veterinary school in Berlin to get the necessary resources and 
information. Behring was not only excused military service and appointed 
to the Institute for Infectious Diseases in order to do research, he was also 
supported by Friedrich Althoff (1839-1908), Deputy Assistant Under-Sec-
retary [Ministerialdirektor] in the Prussian Ministry for Cultural Affairs 
and financed by the Farbwerke Hoechst. In the next stage, the network 
between industry, state and science was enlarged.
4. The production of diphtheria serum in the German empire
Only two companies had invested in the development of the diphtheria 
serum in the German Empire. As described above, the Farbwerke Hoechst, 
formerly known as Meister, Lucius and Brüning, had a contract with Emil 
Behring, and Schering had supported Hans Aronson. After the first phials 
became available in the pharmacies and it was clear that this product would 
be a great economic success, three other companies started producing serum 
 22. In comparison to France, for example, this was not very different because several military sur-
geons from Vâl de Grace were educated at the Pasteur Institute, and the production plant 
for diphtheria serum of the Pasteur Institute in Garches was a former military stable. The 
difference was the institutionalisation of this exchange in Germany.
 23. The head of the Testing Department [Prüfungstechnische Abteilung] of the Institute for Experi-
mental Therapy in Frankfurt [Institut für experimentelle Therapie, which would later become 
the Paul-Ehrlich-Institut] was also a military surgeon, cf. the annual reports in the archive of 
the Paul Ehrlich Institute (Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Langen – hereafter APEI), Dept. IV, No. 1.
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in Germany, all before the end of 1895. In Darmstadt the well-established 
company E. Merck —producer of pharmaceuticals and chemicals— went 
into production. In the south of Germany, the Pasteur Institute opened a 
branch in Stuttgart, and in Hamburg two pharmacists started producing 
diphtheria serum and set up the company Ruete & Enoch 24.
The Farbwerke Hoechst not only cooperated with Behring, they also 
built up a bacteriological research laboratory doing research in parallel to 
Behring’s but with a focus on the problems associated with the industrial 
production of serum. Arnold Libbertz (1843-1916), a close friend of Robert 
Koch, became the first director of the research laboratory. After the suc-
cessful completion of clinical trials in spring 1894, the management of the 
Farbwerke Hoechst decided to build a new production plant specifically 
for serum production. The new buildings were officially inaugurated in 
November 1894. Schering followed in fall 1894 with the installation of its 
own bacteriological production department, with Hans Aronson as direc-
tor. Producing serum in an industrial style is, however, a little misleading, 
as the production plant looked more like farms than factories (fig. 1). The 
production plant was in general divided into two buildings: a stable where 
around forty horses were housed and a laboratory for the breeding of the 
bacterial cultures, the test procedures and the preparation of the serum.
The new ‘production plant’ at Farbwerke Höchst set the standard 
for serum production in Germany (see fig. 2). Arnold Eiermann gave an 
enthusiastic description of his visit to the complex of buildings in the 
Münchener Medicinische Wochenschrift 25. The process of serum produc-
tion was complicated, starting with the «production» of diphtheria toxin, 
using pure cultures of diphtheria-bacillus sown on a special medium. This 
culture medium was composed of cooked meat with one percent peptone, 
sodium chloride and caustic soda. The culture heated, filtered, poured into 
flasks, sterilised and then inseminated with the bacteria. After breeding for 
several days in the culture-chamber at a constant temperature between 34 
and 39° Celsius the cultures were killed using a disinfectant and treated 
 24. The official procedure to become a state approved serum producer is documented in BA 
Berlin, R 86/1646; information about the producer in APEI, Dept. Vd. See also THROM, n. 10, 
pp. 164-193.
 25. EIERMANN, Arnold. Die Einrichtung zur Darstellung des Diphtherie-Heilserums in den Höchster 
Farbwerken. Münchener Medicinische Wochenschrift, 1894, Nr. 41, 1038-1040.
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with carbolic acid for conservation 26. The production of toxin was difficult 
because the process depended on the strain of bacteria, the culture medium 
(agar or nutrient solution), the preparation of the culture medium, the 
duration and the temperature of the breeding process, and the disinfectant 
used to kill the bacteria. The precise manner of producing the toxin varied 
from company to company. The process was important for the fabrication 
of serum because the value of the serum depended on the strength of the 
toxin used to immunize the animals. On the one hand, the more potent 
the toxin, the more powerful the final serum, while on the other hand, a 
strong toxin could cause inflammations at the injection site, and hinder 
the process of serum production.
 26. THROM, note 10, pp. 82-86.
Figure 1. The Bacteriological Department at the Farbwerke Hoechst after 1900. Emil von Behring 
Archive, Marburg – Germany.
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The immunisation process itself took a longer period of time; in 1894, 
it took between four and five months, but by 1900, thanks to the additional 
experience, the process took only four weeks. During this period of im-
munisation, the horses were inoculated at regular time intervals —between 
eight and eleven times— with increasing doses of toxin. Test-bleedings 
revealed the moment when the antitoxin units in the serum reached their 
expected maximum. In the new production plant of the Farbwerke Hoechst 
the bleeding occurred in a separately equipped operation room in the stable 
Figure 2. The «production plant». The Bacteriological Department at the 
Farbwerke Hoechst 1894. Emil von Behring Archive, Marburg – Germany.
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building. When the value of the antitoxin had reached the highest possible 
point, the horse was brought into the operating room, tied up, the puncture 
point shaved and disinfected, and a trocar was placed in the jugular vein. 
The blood came out via a cannula and was collected in a sterilised vessel. 
The process was used to collect five or six litres of blood per horse provid-
ing three litres of serum 27.
Figure 3. A popular picture of the production of diphtheria serum at the Behringwerke in Marburg, 
around 1906. On the left side the inoculation of toxin, on the right side the bleeding. Emil von 
Behring Archive, Marburg – Germany.
According to the report in the Münchener Medicinische Wochenschrift, 
the rest of the ‘production process’ took place in the laboratory building. 
The vessels were closed and stored in a cool chamber. After 24 hours, when 
 27. The production is described in OTTO, Richard. Die staatliche Prüfung der Heilsera (Arbeiten 
aud dem Königlichen Institut für experimentelle Therapie zu Frankfurt a. M. – vol. 2),  Jena, 
Gustav Fischer, 1906, pp. 15-17. 
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the red blood cells had separated from the serum, the blood was filtered, 
centrifuged and underwent a bacteriological analysis. If the serum was 
found to be germ-free, it was treated with 0.5 percent carbolic acid for 
conservation and to keep it sterile. Every production step was recorded 
in different registers. After the evaluation procedure had fixed the final 
value of the serum in terms of immunisation units it was poured into phials 
that were corked 28. A label was placed on each phial stating the quantity 
of serum, its potency in terms of immunisation units, a unique operation 
number and the date the phial was filled. Finally, the phial was wrapped in 
paper, packed in a wooden box, and sent out to the pharmacies 29. Arnold 
Eiermann remarked at the end of his article that the horses were in excel-
 28. Later on, the phials were closed with a rubber plug or heat sealed (fig. 4).
 29. THROM, note 10, pp. 99-113; EIERMANN, note 25. 
Figure 4. Different serum samples with liquid serum and serum powder, 
produced between 1897 and 1910. The photograph was probably taken 
around 1940. Emil von Behring Archive, Marburg – Germany.
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lent condition, that they received good care, and looked very healthy. Such 
care was necessary because after a short period of «holiday» the process 
of immunization would start again. The experimental system transformed 
within a short period of time into a production system. Nevertheless, the 
main problem of this production system was the stabilisation of the differ-
ent varying factors of production.
5. State control of diphtheria serum
The diphtheria serum was an ambivalent object for the medical authori-
ties. On the one hand, the serum offered an apparently effective treatment 
of diphtheria and other deadly infectious diseases, with the mortality rate 
for diphtheria significantly decreasing shortly after the introduction of the 
serum. On the other hand, the new serum therapy presented several public 
health risks. Furthermore, despite the complexity of the serum production 
process, any health professional trained in bacteriology could produce 
serum on the basis of the published research results and the process was 
not patentable. Furthermore, the production of serum was a profitable 
business, with Farbwerke Höchst paying off the cost of the bacteriological 
department described above at the end of 1894 thanks to serum sales, and 
enjoying an estimated profit of 707,000 Marks by the end of 1895 30. The 
evident economic incentives combined with the lack of experience with 
biological remedies like diphtheria serum and the lack of any information 
about its long-term effects made the medical administration anxious about 
unscrupulous producers who might want to imitate Höchst’s production 
process. In the last days of October 1894, the extraordinary members of 
the Imperial Health Office were invited for a meeting to discuss the new 
serum therapy and the possibilities of state control.
The easy appraisal of Behring’s diphtheria serum by the experts on the 
basis of its therapeutic success, and the rising demand for the diphtheria 
serum makes it necessary to discuss government measures concerning the 
 30. THROM, note 10, tab. IV in the appendices; LAUBENHEIMER, August. Zur Geschichte der 
Serumdarstellung in den Farbwerken [The history of the serum therapy at the Farbwerke 
Hoechst], June 1904, Behring Archive, University of Marburg, 8-01, Correspondence with the 
Farbwerke Hoechst, doc. 678.
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production, distribution and use of this new therapy in order to protect 
public health 31.
In early November 1894, a conference brought together medical of-
ficials from the Prussian Ministry for Cultural Affairs, representatives of 
the federal states, the Imperial Health Office and the relevant scientists 
from the Prussian Institute for Infectious Diseases; Paul Ehrlich, Robert 
Koch and Emil Behring. The conference was organized by the Imperial 
Health Office, which was the highest medical institution in the German 
Empire, answerable only to the Chancellor and the Imperial Office of the 
Interior [the Reichsamt des Innern, which became the Ministry of the In-
terior after 1918]. At this conference, the participants discussed the new 
serum therapy and the need to protect the public against impure and/or 
ineffective serum 32.
Over the course of several meetings between November 1894 and 
February 1895 a system of state control was drafted. Starting in December, 
representatives of the pharmaceutical industry were also invited to participate 
at the meetings 33. To make sure that the distribution of diphtheria serum 
was limited to medical specialists, it was decided that, in accordance with 
an imperial decree from January 1890, the diphtheria serum could only 
be sold in pharmacies. Secondly, in line with the federal resolution of July 
1891, a prescription was required for the diphtheria serum. The imperial 
law was worked out in November and December 1894 by members of the 
Imperial Health Office and after a few weeks of consultation put into force 
in January 1895 34. In the absence of empirical knowledge about the impact 
of the serum it was decided to accompany its introduction onto the market 
by the compilation of a set of medical statistics intended to monitor the 
effectiveness of the new serum therapy and identify any side effects 35.
 31. Invitation of the extraordinary members of the Imperial Health Office to a conference on the 
new diphtheria serum, 3rd November of 1894, BA Berlin, R 86/1646.
 32. The minutes of the meeting from 3rd and 5th of November 1894, BA Berlin, R 86/1646.
 33. The minutes of the meeting from 3rd and 5th of November 1894, BA Berlin, R 86/1646. Back-
ground information concerning the importance of the conference is to be found in ZEISS 
and BIELING, note 11, pp. 153-157; HÜNTELMANN, Axel C. Gesundheitspolitik im Kaiserreich 
und in der Weimarer Republik. Das Reichsgesundheitsamt von 1876-1933, Diss. Phil., University 
of Bremen, 2006.
 34. Reichsgesetzblatt [Law gazette] 1895, 1.
 35. The minutes of the meeting from 3rd and 5th of November 1894, BA Berlin, R 86/1646. 
The results of the statistics were published as «Ergebnisse der Sammelforschung über das 
Diphtherieheilserum für die Zeit vom April 1895 bis März 1896» and sent to every library in 
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The most significant part of this legislation concerned the state control 
of the production and distribution of the serum. Until the 1880s, the qual-
ity control of the ingredients and the preparation of pharmaceuticals lay 
in the hands of the pharmacists. With the rising pharmaceutical industry, 
it became difficult for the apothecary to analyse the ingredients in terms 
of their purity, meaning that he could no longer guarantee the quality of 
the tablets or pills 36. Indeed, the efficacy and potency of the serum could 
only be determined by a trained expert. The ‘industrial’ production of 
serum pushed this same process forward, with the industry instead of the 
pharmacies increasingly becoming the site of both, production and quality 
control 37.
As far as the production of serum was concerned, the state system 
of supervision combined central and local elements. The process was 
permanently monitored in the production plant by a medical official, paid 
by the producer but answerable to the state in the form of the Ministry of 
Cultural Affairs or the district president. The bleeding took place under the 
supervision of this medical official. After the value of immunisation units 
was fixed, the vessel containing the serum was closed, locked and a serum 
sample sent to a state-run institute for testing the quality of the serum 38. 
At the one German serological institute, the serum was tested for purity as 
well as being evaluated and certified. At this institute, the value of serum 
the German Empire as well as several other institutions. BA Berlin, R 86/1646; and a summary 
was published in the Arbeiten aus dem Kaiserlichen Gesundheitsamt, 1897, 13, 254-292; also 
see BEHRING, Emil. Die Statistik in der Heilserumfrage, Marburg, N. G. Elwert’sche Verlagsbuch-
handlung, 1895.
 36. The aim of the control was the reduction of sources of error. With the process of industrial-
ization it was easier to control a few producers than to control thousands of pharmacies.
 37. HOLSTEN, Jürgen. Das Kaiserliche Gesundheitsamt und die Pharmazie. Dargestellt an der Entstehung 
des Deutschen Arzneibuches, fünfte Ausgabe, Diss. med., Free University Berlin, 1977; HICKEL, 
Erika. Arzneimittel-Standardisierung im 19. Jahrhundert in den Pharmakopöen Deutschlands, 
Frankreichs, Großbritanniens und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Darmstadt, Wissen-
schaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1973; WIMMER, Wolfgang. «Wir haben fast immer war Neues». 
Gesundheitswesen und Innovation der Pharma-Industrie in Deutschland, 1880-1935, Berlin, 
Duncker & Humblot, 1994.
 38. The serological institute was founded in February 1895 as a Control station for Diphtheria 
Serum [Controlstation für Diphtherieserum]. A year later, in 1896, the field of activity was 
enlarged to cover all sera, and the institute renamed the Institute for Serological Research and 
Serological Survey (Institut für Serumforschung und Serumprüfung). In 1899, the institute moved 
from Berlin to Frankfurt and was renamed again, becoming the Institute for Experimental 
Therapy (Institut für Experimentelle Therapie) and was finally renamed after the Second World 
War as the Paul-Ehrlich-Institut. Hereafter, I will use the abbreviation, serological institute.
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proposed by the manufacturer and expressed in immunisation units was 
verified by means of a complex procedure and the serum was tested for 
its overall quality. If everything was in accordance with the guidelines, a 
certificate validating the approved quality and strength in immunisation 
units was completed and sent to the producer. The medical official on site 
could now release the relevant vessel of serum for decanting into phials 
for distribution. Every step of the whole ‘production process’ was carefully 
recorded in a register and referred to a single operation number, which 
made it possible to trace the phial sold in the pharmacy back to the host-
animal and the day of bleeding —and vice versa. There were also strict 
regulations concerning the handling, labelling and packaging of the serum 
at the end of the manufacturing process, and the sale price was regulated, 
with special tariffs for social security insurance, welfare institutions and 
hospitals. Finally, the producers guaranteed the withdrawal of phials from 
pharmacies after two years or in the case of ineffective or impure serum. 
The system was implemented within a few months, and the central state 
institute for serum control set up 39. After 1 April 1895, only state-certified 
serum could be legally sold in Germany 40.
In order to produce state approved serum a company first had to ap-
ply for permission and they had to prove their ability to produce serum. 
Beyond this, the candidate had to pay an «entrance fee» of 1 000 Marks to 
the serological institute to enable them to submit their serum for testing. 
As mentioned above, a candidate producer had to recruit a medical official 
to monitor the production process. Finally, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, 
aided by the district president, was to inquire into the company’s reputation, 
as well as carrying out an initial audit covering all aspects of the proposed 
production process and the associated facilities. The local district veterinary 
and medical officers inspected the company and its surrounding, examin-
ing the condition of the horses, the stables, the laboratory building and 
the devices, equipment and means for serum production and evaluation. 
 39. See the minutes of the meetings from the 17th of December 1894, 17th of January 1895 and 
1st of February 1895 and the correspondence between the participants of the meetings in 
BA Berlin, R 86/1646; Secret Central Archives (Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, 
hereafter GStA PK), HA 1, Rep. 76 VIII B, No. 3747; for the industry side, see the Histocom 
archive of the Farbwerke Hoechst, Frankfurt, folder GL 18.1/3. For the foundation of the 
serological institute see GStA PK, HA 1, Rep. 76 Vc, Sekt. 1, Tit. XI, part II, No. 18, vol. 1.
 40. A summary is given in EHRLICH, Paul. Die staatliche Controle des Diphtherie-Serums. Berliner 
Klinische Wochenschrift, 1896, 33, 441-443.
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The administration procedures also came under scrutiny 41, with, to cite 
but one example, the medical adviser of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs 
complaining about missing registers when he inspected Schering’s serum 
production facilities in January 1895 42.
The application and the inspection of the company Ruete & Enoch, 
situated in Hamburg, and their distributor Sthamer, Noack & Co. can 
serve to illustrate the functioning of the initial audit. In early spring 1895 
the owner of a chemical laboratory in Hamburg, Carl Enoch, addressed an 
inquiry concerning the production and distribution of diphtheria serum 
to the «Medical Bureau» (the local administrative authority) in Hamburg. 
In April 1895, this Medical Bureau in Hamburg informed the Imperial 
Health Office about their transactions with Enoch in the course of the 
preceding weeks. The Medical Bureau had already gathered information 
about the reputation of the laboratory to determine whether the company 
and its application should be taken seriously. The medical official and head 
of the Hygiene Institute in Hamburg, William Phillipps Dunbar (1863-
1922), contacted Richard Pfeiffer (1858-1945), a member of the Institute 
for Infectious Diseases, where the Control station for Diphtheria Serum 
was housed during its first year of existence, and discussed the provisional 
system for serum control. Furthermore, the district veterinary officer had 
been instructed to visit Enoch’s institute. He was to inspect the stables and 
determine the health condition of the horses. In case of a positive result, 
the medical councillor of Hamburg would contact the Imperial chancellor 
concerning the official state control of serum. In its role as the medical 
advisory board for the Imperial Chancellor, the Imperial Health Office 
informed the Medical Bureau in Hamburg about the legal requirements 
concerning serum production: first, after the initial inspection, the serum 
had to be constantly tested by the Control station for Diphtheria Serum, 
and second, the city of Hamburg had to enact an order on the basis of the 
Imperial Decree concerning the diphtheria serum, specifying that serum 
could only be sold in pharmacies, that a prescription was necessary, and 
 41. For instance OTTO, note 27, chap. B and C.
 42. In December 1894 there was a meeting between two medical councilors of the Ministry for 
Cultural Affairs and the director of Schering. A few weeks later there was an inspection at 
Schering made by one of the councilors and a member of the Imperial Health Office, cf. the 
notice of Adolf Schmidtmann (medical councilor of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs), GStA PK, 
1. HA, Rep. 76 VIII B, No. 3748, fol. 208.
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that only state-approved, sealed phials could be sold in the pharmacies 43. 
In the summer of 1895, the Medical Bureau informed the Imperial Health 
Office about the inspection, confirming that Hamburg had enacted a law 
concerning the handling of diphtheria serum in accordance with Imperial 
and Prussian law. After the successful initial inspection, Enoch was granted 
permission to contact the Control station for Diphtheria Serum concern-
ing the testing procedures in force. After all the formalities had been taken 
care of, the company was allowed to produce and distribute state-approved 
diphtheria serum 44.
As we have seen, the network of serum control was very elaborate. 
The reasons for this complexity were first the federal constitution of the 
German Empire and second the private-public partnership between the 
private serum producing companies and the state-run institutions. The 
competences of the German Empire and the federal states were not entirely 
clear in the case of public health and medical affairs. While the imperial 
authorities were charged with issues concerning medical police and public 
health, the federal states were responsible for «medical affairs». There was 
evidently considerable overlap between these loosely defined spheres. In 
general, the Empire took control whenever any public health problems 
arose that concerned more than one state, as in the case of epidemics 45. 
Moreover, the imperial officers neither disposed of institutions to execute 
the decrees or laws, nor did they have any clear authority over local in-
stitutions, and therefore depended on cooperation with the federal states, 
district governments and their respective institutions 46. This was one of 
 43. The «free» city of Hamburg was a federal state in the German Empire. Matters concerning 
public health and medical police fell within the competence of the German Empire and the 
federal states.
 44. For the complete correspondence see BA Berlin, R 86/1646; and file in APEI, Dept. Vd, No. 4, 
vol. 1.
 45. For further information about health policy in Germany see WOELK, Wolfgang; VÖGELE, Jörg 
(eds.) Geschichte der Gesundheitspolitik in Deutschland. Von der Weimarer Republik bis in die 
Frühgeschichte der «doppelten Staatsgründung», Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2002, esp. the 
introduction; public health in the German Empire cf. WEINDLING, Paul J. Health, Race and 
German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870-1945, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989. 
 46. The lack of any executive bodies was also a problem for the Imperial (Office) Ministry of 
Interior, see GROEBEN, Klaus von der, Reichsinnenministerium. In: JESERICH, Kurt G. A. (ed.), 
Deutsche Verwaltungsgeschichte, vol. 4: Das Reich als Republik und in der Zeit des Nationalso-
zialismus, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1985, pp. 156-168. 
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the reasons why several conferences brought together imperial and federal 
medical officials to implement the institutional network of serum control 
and to ensure continued cooperation.
As a result of the general confusion concerning local and imperial 
competence and the lack of executive institutions on the local level, the 
confiscation of out-of-date or ineffective serum —conceived of as a routine 
operation— proved to be quite complicated. The Empire was responsible 
for the drug legislation, while the pharmacies were supervised by the 
Ministry of Cultural Affairs. The confiscation of serum should illustrate 
the complex interactions between imperial, federal and local authorities. 
The initial situation was the regular confiscation of serum after two (and 
later after three) years or after an apothecary had notified the serologi-
cal institute concerning ineffective serum. In both cases the serological 
institute informed the Prussian Ministry of Cultural Affairs, providing the 
operation numbers of the serum that had to be confiscated. The Ministry 
of Cultural Affairs in turn informed the Imperial Office of the Interior, 
which in turn sent up the information to the highest relevant authority, 
the Imperial Health Office. The Imperial Health Office now had to prepare 
an official decree concerning the confiscation of the serum that was sent 
back to the Imperial Office of the Interior and the Chancellor who signed 
and implemented the decree. Afterwards, the imperial decree was sent 
as a circular to the relevant ministries of the federal states for execution, 
with the imperial decree being transformed into a state decree. The state 
decree was published in an official newspaper and finally sent to the district 
president. The district president and the district medical officer supervised 
the actual confiscation of the serum in the pharmacies 47. An urgent and 
apparently simple demand was, therefore, followed by a long and complex 
administrative procedure that added as many delays as there were layers 
of competent administrative bodies involved.
Another reason for the complex system of serum control was the public-
private partnership that existed in Germany. When the first phials became 
available in pharmacies in August 1894 there was no pre-existent blue print 
for how to introduce a new ‘biological’ product onto the pharmaceutical 
market. When the medical officials met at the conference in November 
 47. The complete process is documented in BA Berlin, R 86/1646; GStA PK, HA 1, Rep. 76 VIII B, 
No. 3749-3752; APEI, Dept. Va, No. 2, vol. 1.
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1894, they discussed the idea of founding a central state-run institute for 
serum production, but then withdrew this project. As Schering and the 
Farbwerke Hoechst had already invested a great deal of money, it was very 
possible that the two companies would take legal proceedings against the 
state and sue for financial compensation 48. Thus the ‘easiest’ way to guar-
antee the purity and potency of the serum while ensuring a form of state 
supervision was the introduction of a central institute for serum control as 
an obligatory point of passage 49. Only state-approved serum was allowed 
to be sold legally on the pharmaceutical market. 
6. Serum networks and indirect state regulation
This article has given a brief overview of the history of diphtheria serum at 
the end of the 19th century, covering the «development» of serum therapy, 
the production of a new remedy of biological origin and the introduction 
of state control to minimize public health risks. The history of serum pro-
duction and state regulation is also the history of a network. Numerous 
(human) actors had been described. Already during the period of research 
and experimentation, a thought-collective of scientists and laboratory staff 
was involved, either communicating directly within the research groups 
or indirectly via the published research results. The scientists concerned 
came from a variety of different backgrounds: military surgeons, medical 
officials, veterinaries, laboratory staff, physicians and scientific members 
of the state-run research institutes and the university laboratories as well 
as physicians in the hospitals. The network was enlarged when industry 
became involved in serum research and again with the state control of serum 
production. In the production plant, medical officials collaborated closely 
with the staff and the scientists of the bacteriological departments. 
 48. See the notes on a meeting on October 19th 1894 in the Imperial Health Office, BA Berlin, R 
86/1646; and the minutes of a meeting at the Prussian Ministry of Cultural Affairs on Octo-
ber 24th 1894, GStA PK, HA 1, Rep. 76 VIII B, No. 3747; moreover an undated report from B. 
Fraenkel about the distribution of diphtheria serum in France, ibid; for further information 
THROM, note 10, p. 71-72. Later on, however, the idea of a state-run institute for serological 
research and serum production was only raised by medical officials as a bargaining tool 
when problems emerged with the serum producers.
 49. For the obligatory point of passage, see LATOUR, note 19.
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For the large-scale manufacturer of a biological product the main prob-
lem was the stabilisation of the varying production factors to «produce» a 
standardized remedy. The production process was steadily improved and 
monitored by a network consisting of elements from the scientific com-
munity, state and industry. Local authorities also featured in this network, 
as we have seen with the example involving the district medical officer. 
Beyond this, the network also ensured the indirect state regulation and 
control of serum production. On the one hand, the network of control was 
meant to ensure the purity and potency of the serum to protect the public 
and to avoid any public health scandals of the type seen with tuberculin. 
On the other hand, the network also guaranteed a remedy of a standardized 
quality with respect to the standards introduced by the state.
What is the difference between direct and indirect state regulation in 
the case of diphtheria serum? An indirect model of state regulation might 
have been, if the serum was produced by companies operating on the free 
market, probably with safety standards fixed by laws. Under direct state 
regulation one can probably imagine a situation in that one or perhaps 
several state-run institution will produce the serum on its own. Such an 
institute would have been founded by the state and operated by medical 
officials. The state as serum producer could now guarantee for the qual-
ity and potency of the serum. Furthermore, the serum could be stocked 
in regional serum depots and sent out to the physicians on request, or, 
in a more market-oriented system the serum could be distributed by the 
pharmacies. This kind of model was discussed in the first meetings about 
the organisation of the serum system, referring to the French model, with 
the idea of founding a single institute to produce and distribute the serum. 
This idea was soon put aside. In the ongoing discussions concerning an 
appropriate system of state control the medical officials took into account 
that there were several serum producers in different locations and for the 
control of serum production and distribution a central institute for serum 
control was necessary. The regulation of the diphtheria serum in the Ger-
man Empire could be characterized as lying somewhere between these 
two poles: the serum was produced by private competing pharmaceutical 
companies on the free market, but their freedom was restricted by an ini-
tial audit to confirm the company’s ability to produce pure and effective 
serum. Furthermore, the market for diphtheria serum was restricted to 
companies that could afford the entrance fee of 1,000 Mark and who were 
able to remunerate a medical official working in the production plant. On 
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this account only large companies could produce and distribute diphtheria 
serum on the German market. Finally, a sample of every batch of serum 
had to be sent to a central state-run control station to guarantee the qual-
ity, purity and potency of the serum. Thus, the central institute for quality 
assurance represented an obligatory passage point for all serum, and could 
serve to block the business of one or more companies.
To enforce this indirect governmental control a wide network of actors 
had to be positioned and interconnected. The serum producers had to be 
involved as well as the scientists and the public health administration to 
insure a process of control. In the end, however, every actor was bound 
into this tightly linked network making direct governmental sanctions more 
or less unnecessary. ❚

